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ZONING--JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY TO SERVE THE REGIONAL

WELFARE IN ZONING DECISIONS-SAVE v.

City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d

862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
In 1975 the city of Bothell rezoned a 141-acre parcel of farmland to
permit construction of a major regional shopping center.1 The rezone ordinance was passed after extensive public hearings before the Bothell
planning commission and city council and after a majority of Bothell's
voters had supported the proposal on an advisory ballot proposition. 2 The
ordinance conditioned the rezone upon the execution of a concomitant
zoning agreement between the city and property owners, designed to protect against adverse economic and enviromental impacts of the develop3
ment.

Save a Valuable Environment (SAVE), a Washington nonprofit corporation made up of residents of King and Snohomish Counties, petitioned
the King County Superior Court for a writ of certiorari 4 to review the
action of the planning commission and city council in adopting the rezone. 5 The trial court invalidated the ordinance, 6 and the property owners
appealed the decision to the Washington Supreme Court.
The court affirmed, holding that when a zoning action may cause serious environmental or economic impacts beyond jurisdictional borders, 7
1. SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d 862, 864, 576 P.2d 401, 403 (1978).
2. The planning commission considered the rezone application at thirteen public meetings and
held ten public hearings before voting unanimously for approval. The city council conducted twentyfour meetings and study sessions. After placing the proposal before the voters on the advisory ballot
proposition, the city council held two more public hearings to take further testimony before finally
approving the rezone by a vote of 4-3. Brief for Appellants at 9-12, SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89
Wn. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
3. Bothell, Wash., Ordinance 754 (Feb. 18, 1975).
4. R.C.W. § 7.16.040 (1979) provides that a writ of certiorari shall be granted by any court
where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction, or to correct an erroneous or void proceeding when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at law.
5. SAVE's standing to challenge the ordinance on environmental grounds was upheld by both the
trial court and the supreme court. The supreme court expressly adopted the position stated by the
federal courts in such cases as Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), requiring allegation of a direct and
specific injury to a member of the suing organization. 89 Wn. 2d at 868, 576 P.2d at 404-05.
6. The trial court found that Bothell's action was not arbitrary and capricious since the rezone
could benefit the health, safety, and general welfare of Bothell's citizens. Conclusion of Law No. 6,
Finding of Fact No. 33, Save a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, No. 799395 (Wash. Super.
Ct., King County, Sept. 30, 1976). However, the court set aside the ordinance on the ground that it
would not serve the welfare of the entire affected community and thus constituted illegal spot zoning.
In addition to the city of Bothell, the affected community included portions of King and Snohomish
Counties. Conclusion of Law No. 7, Finding of Fact No. 33.
7. In this case the rezoned land lay within Bothell's city limits, bordered on the north by land in
Snohomish County zoned for low density residential use, and on the east and portions of the south by
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8
the zoning body must serve the welfare of the entire affected community.
Since Bothell had "completely disregarded" impacts beyond the city
limits, 9 passage of the rezone ordinance constituted arbitrary and capricious conduct. ' 0
After briefly noting the background of relevant Washington law, Part I
of this note analyzes the SAVE court's reasoning to reveal indications of
an underlying interventionism in its review of the rezone. Part II assesses
the problems of such judicial intervention, first in the exclusionary zoning
cases relied upon by the SAVE court for its regional welfare standard, and
then in the context of zoning actions with the kind of extralocal environmental impacts presented by SAVE. Finally, arguments favoring increased judicial intervention are presented. The note concludes that there
are both practical and doctrinal justifications for heightened judicial
scrutiny of environmental impacts in the multijurisdictional setting in
cases like SAVE. However, an awareness of the social costs of an overly
interventionist judiciary is likely to moderate the intensity of judicial review. From this perspective, the court's result and its opinion in SAVE are
approved.

I. THE REGIONAL WELFARE DUTY
A.

The Law Priorto SAVE

Washington courts have long upheld the validity of local zoning ordinances on the basis of the police power of the municipality. I' The
exercise of this power must exhibit "a substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."' 12 In SAVE, the Washington
land in unincorporated King County zoned for agricultural use. 89 Wn. 2d at 864, 576 P.2d at 403.
8. 89 Wn. 2d at 869, 576 P.2d at 406.
9. Id. at 870, 576 P.2d at 405-06. The court singled out four specific types of impacts that would
result from the rezone: (1)pressures for secondary business growth, necessitating substantial investments in highways, sewers, and other services and utilities, and leading to the loss of desirable agricultural land; (2) the need for millions of dollars in additional highway funds and the corresponding
possibility of serious air pollution from increased traffic; (3) the possibility of flooding caused by the
realignment of a creek to accomodate the development; and (4) the unstable peat soil upon which the
development was to take place may settle unevenly, with unknown consequences. Id. at 868-69, 576
P.2d at 405.
10. Id. at 869, 576 P.2d at 405. The court also found the rezone procedure violated the
appearance of fairness doctrine because two members of the planning commission were also members of the Bothell Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors which had voted to actively support the
shopping center proposal. 89 Wn. 2d at 872, 576 P.2d at 407. Discussion of the appearance of fairness issue is beyond the scope of this note.
11. See, e.g., McNaughton v. Boeing, 68 Wn. 2d 659, 662, 414 P.2d 778, 780 (1966) (zoning
ordinances constitutional in principle as valid exercise of the police power).
12. Id.
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Supreme Court for the first time defined the general welfare as that of the
"entire affected community," determined without regard to jurisdictional
borders. 13
Prior to SAVE no Washington court had specifically identified whose
interests must be considered in defining the general welfare. This fact is
largely attributable to the traditional reluctance with which the judiciary
has approached the review of local zoning actions involving the exercise
of legislative judgment or discretion. 14 In one prior case, Bishop v. Town
ofHoughton, 15 the court had an opportunity to define the general welfare
as multijurisdictional, 16 but merely sustained the town's decision on traditional grounds. 17 While the court implied that the welfare to be served
was not determined by the town's boundaries, 18 its deferential review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard prevented identification of the
extralocal components of the general welfare concept. In an earlier case,
13. 89 Wn. 2d at 869, 576 P.2d at 405.
14. In State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wn. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967) the court
stated what has become its standard language concerning the judicial review of such actions:
Zoning is a discretionary exercise of police power by a legislative authority. Courts will not
review, except for manifest abuse, the exercise of legislative discretion. Manifest abuse of discretion involves arbitrary and capricious conduct. Such conduct is defined to be without
consideration and in disregard of the facts. One who asserts that a public authority has abused its
discretion and is guilty of arbitrary, capricious, and unreasoning conduct has the burden of
proof. If the validity of the legislative authority's classification for zoning purposes is fairly
debatable, it will be sustained.
Id. at 210, 422 P.2d at 792 (citations ommitted). See also Farrell v. City of Seattle, 75 Wn. 2d 540,
543, 452 P.2d 965, 967 (1969); Carlson v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wn. 2d 41, 45, 435 P.2d 957, 959
(1968).
15. 69 Wn. 2d 786, 420 P.2d 368 (1966).
16. In Bishop residents of Bellevue and Clyde Hill brought suit to review the Town of Houghton's refusal to grant a rezone. The existing ordinance permitted construction of high rise apartment
buildings on land immediately adjacent to residential property owned by petitioners in the neighboring municipalities. When construction of a state highway severed the affected strip of land from the
rest of Houghton, access could only be had through Bellevue and Clyde Hill. On these facts the court
could have identified a duty requiring the Town of Houghton to serve the welfare of the affected
nonresidents.
17. In upholding Houghton's decision not to rezone the parcel, the court reasoned that on the
basis of the record before the town's decisionmakers there was room for an "honest difference of
opinion" concerning the necessity of a rezone. Id. at 794, 420 P.2d at 373.
18. The court assumed without comment that the nonresident petitioners had standing to contest
the decision. The court indicated in dicta that it did not distinguish between residents and nonresidents in identifying the public interest to be served. For a discussion of this aspect of Bishop, see
Clement & Krogh, Regional Planningand LocalAutonomy in Washington Zoning Law, 45 WASH. L.
REv. 593, 614-17 (1970).
Other jurisidictions have explicitly focused upon the scope of the general welfare in similar factual
settings. See Scott v. City of Indian wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972);
Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). Those courts have
recognized the right of affected nonresidents to be heard and receive equal consideration along with
residents' interests.
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State ex rel. Pruzan v. Redman, 19 the court also appeared to recognize a
regional standard for land use regulation, but in its deferential review inquired only whether the decisionmaking body had "considered" the

planning of the neighboring jurisdiction. 20 Thus while there had been
some indication that the general welfare was not to be defined on the basis

of jurisdictional boundary lines, no prior Washington decision had turned
upon that ground. The court twice upheld zoning decisions of greater than
local impact, exercising in both cases a deferential review under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
B.

The Court'sReasoning in SAVE

The "crux of the problem," according to the SAVE court, was that
construction of a major regional shopping center in Bothell would have

serious detrimental effects on areas outside the city. 2 1 Because of these
impacts, the court imposed upon the zoning body a duty to serve the welfare of the entire community that was seriously and directly 22 affected by
the zoning decision. The court found that Bothell had "completely disre-

garded" adverse environmental and economic impacts outside the city 23
19. 60 Wn. 2d 521, 374 P.2d 1002 (1962).
20. Id. at 531-32, 374 P.2d at 1009.
21. 89 Wn. 2d at 868, 576 P.2d at 405. To support this statement, the court referred to letters
received by the city from planning officials outside Bothell in response to a draft environmental
impact statement (EIS). These letters indicated that the EIS "failed to address serious problems created by the shopping center proposal." Id. The court then detailed four of the anticipated problems,
including increased traffic congestion and pressures for secondary business growth, without specifying whether it also found that the EIS failed to address these problems, and if so, how it reached this
conclusion. The court said only that "[u]nder these circumstances, Bothell may not act in disregard of
the effects outside its boundaries." Id. at 869, 576 P.2d at 405. Later in its opinion, however, in
apparent reference to these same impacts, the court concluded that "adverse environmental effects
and potentially severe financial burdens.., have been completely disregarded." Id. at 870, 576 P.2d
at 405-06.
22. The court broadly defined "directly affected" to include not only areas which would suffer
adverse environmental impacts such as flooding or air pollution, but also "areas which would experience pressure to alter the land uses contemplated by their own comprehensive plans." Id. at 869, 576
P.2d at 405.
The Washington court has subsequently stated that the tendency of a zoning decision to create
pressure for change in surrounding land uses is an appropriate consideration even outside the
multijurisdictional setting of SAVE. See Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wn. 2d 59, 578 P.2d
1309 (1978) (holding it proper to consider a strictly local development's potential for creating pressure to alter surrounding land uses in evaluating a building permit application, citing SAVE).
23. 89 Wn. 2d at 870, 576 P.2d at 405-06. The court's use of the term "affected community" in
identifying the location of the disregarded impacts does not preclude the possibility that impacts
within Bothell were also found to be disregarded. Indeed, some of the impacts mentioned by the
court, such as air pollution, could hardly have been considered in relation to the city and at the same
time have been disregarded in relation to areas outside the city. Nevertheless, the "crux of the problem" focused upon by the court throughout its opinion was the detrimental effects of the rezone on
areas outside Bothell. Id. at 868, 576 P.2 at 405.
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in approving the rezone, and concluded the rezone could not be sustained. 2 4 The court cited recent exclusionary zoning cases from other
jurisdictions which imposed a duty on local zoning bodies to serve the
regional welfare in decisions affecting the availability of adequate housing, 25 and found an analogous duty where zoning decisions could have
extralocal effects on environmental quality. The court placed special emphasis upon the policy, stated in Washington's State Environmental Policy Act 26 (SEPA), that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable
right to a healthful environment." 27 The court found that the
environmental consequences of Bothell's decision threatened that right in
the surrounding community.
C. Analysis
The court's recognition of the regional welfare principle in SAVE and
its finding that Bothell disregarded the extralocal impacts of its decision
appeared to lead directly and logically to invalidation of the rezone. However, in reaching its conclusion that Bothell disregarded these impacts,
the court exhibited none of the deference toward legislative decisions
which is inherent in the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
While on the facts of SAVE it might be possible to reconcile invalidation
of the ordinance with the traditional level of review, the court in its brief
and conclusory opinion makes no effort to do so, raising significant questions about the court's future role in the enforcement of the regional welfare duty in Washington.
Traditionally, Washington courts would overturn a zoning decision
only upon a finding of arbitrary and capricious conduct, defined as conduct "without consideration and in disregard of the facts.' '28 If the valid24. Id. at870,576P.2dat406.
25. The court quoted from Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557
P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976), and cited generally to Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), and
Berenson v. Town of New Castle 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.2d 672 (1975). For a
discussion of these cases, see notes 47-66 and accompanying text infra.
The typical exclusionary zoning case involves the validity of a municipality's attempt to preserve
the status quo within its borders by the enactment of zoning ordinances which tend to exclude certain
types of undersirable land uses. These ordinances often obstruct growth, impose restrictive minimum
lot size requirements, and prohibit the construction of low income or multifamily housing. See generally Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward InclusionaryLand Use Controls, 22 SYPRAcus- L. Rav. 509 (1971); Rubinowitz, ExclusionaryZoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 U.
MicH. J.L. REF. 625 (1973).
26. WAsH. Rv. CoDEch. 43.21C (1979).
27. Id. § 43.21C.020(3) (1979).
28. State ex rel. Myhre v. Spokane, 70 Wn. 2d 207,210,422 P.2d 790, 792 (1967). See note 14
supra.
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ity of the zoning ordinance was "fairly debatable," the zoning would be
sustained. Under this standard of review a court will not substitute its
judgment for that of local decisionmakers if there is room for two opinions and the zoning decision resulted from due consideration of all rele29
vant facts.
By all appearances Bothell's decision was made after due consideration
of all relevant facts. The city never denied its obligation to consider the
impacts of the rezone on areas outside its borders. 30 Rather, it argued it
had fulfilled its duty to serve the regional welfare by consulting with King
and Snohomish County officials, 3 1 considering their positions, and reflecting their concerns in the requirements of the concomitant zoning
32
agreement.
Given Bothell's strong showing of consideration of extralocal interests,
one might reasonably expect the court to have deferred to the city council's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Indeed, in State ex rel. Pruzan v. Redman, 33 relied upon by Bothell in its
brief, 34 the court refused to inquire beyond whether the decisionmaking
35
body had consideredthe planning of a neighboring jurisdiction.
In concluding that Bothell had failed to serve the regional welfare, the
SAVE court clearly adopted a deeper level of judicial review than that employed in Pruzan. Rather than limiting its inquiry to whether Bothell
"considered" extralocal impacts, the court went on to measure the sufficiency of that consideration. The court mischaracterized Bothell's argument as being that under Pruzan, "inviting and receiving comment from
neighboring jurisdicitions is sufficient consideration of their interests." 36
29. Bishop v. Town of Houghton, 69 Wn. 2d 786, 794, 420 P.2d 386, 373 (1966).
30. Reply Brief for Appellants at 6-7, SAVE v. City of Bothell 89 Wn. 2d 682, 576 P.2d 401
(1978).
31. The city of Bothell sent copies of its draft environmental impact statement to, among others,
the planning departments of both King and Snohomish Counties, the Washington Department of
Highways, and the Puget Sound Governmental Conference.
32. Brief for Appellants at 28, 35; Reply Brief for Appellants at 6-9, SAVE v. City of Bothell
89 Wn. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
33. 60 Wn. 2d 521,374 P.2d 1002 (1962). See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
34. Brief for Appellants at 34-35; Reply Brief for Appellants at 8, SAVE v. City of Bothell 89
Wn. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
35. In Pruzan the plaintiff challenged a conditional use permit issued by King County for property adjoining the city of Bellevue, contending in part that the county's action was arbitrary and capricious because it ignored the planning of the city of Bellevue. The court responded that it need only
decide whether the county board considered the planning of the city of Bellevue. 60 Wn. 2d at 531,
374 P.2d at 1009.
36. 89 Wn. 2d at 870, 576 P.2d at 406. Examination of the city's brief reveals that the SAVE
court was unfair in so characterizing Bothell's argument. The city was appealing from the trial court's
finding of a spot zone. Thus, it argued that Pruzan required consideration of the planning of other
jurisdictions but not absolute consistency with that planning. The city contended that it had considered the concerns of the affected jurisdictions to a degree far beyond that required by Pruzan. Brief
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So characterized, Bothell's position was summarily rejected.3 7 The court
then considered the concomitant zoning agreement, which the city argued
reflected its consideration of extralocal interests. The court noted that the
agreement did not provide for any specific measures to protect areas outside Bothell and concluded that " '[t]he main concern evidenced is to
'mitigate impacts which are adverse to the environment or the economy
of the City of Bothell.' "38
While it is thus clear that the court stepped beyond Pruzan's limited,
procedural review 39 to examine the sufficiency of the city's consideration
of extralocal interests, it is unclear what level of review was in fact used
in SAVE. Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, which
the court purported to use, Bothell's decision must have been grossly onesided on the merits to explain the court's decision, 40 especially given the
city's clearly documented consideration of extralocal interests.
Other indications suggest that the court employed a deeper level of judicial review. First, the facts of SAVE would only arguably support
invalidation of the rezone under the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review. 4 1 Second, the court made no effort to reconcile its decision with a
for Appellants at 35, SAVE v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978). While it is
apparent that the court did not find Bothell's consideration of extralocal impact adequate, its misstatement of the city's position allowed it to invalidate the rezone without shedding any light upon how it
intends to measure the sufficiency of consideration of such impacts in the future. See notes 39-43 and
accompanying text infra.
37. 89 Wn. 2d at 870, 576 P.2d at 406. While the SAVE court overruled Pruzan "to the extent
that it conflicts with the duty we here impose," id., the court also indicated that Pruzan might be
distinguishable from SAVE. "State ex rel. Pruzan did not involve environmental effects as substafitial
and pervasive as those which will be felt in the North Creek Valley." Id. As a result, it is not entirely
clear that the court will look beyond a showing that extralocal interests were considered in a future
case involving less substantial and pervasive environmental impacts than those involved in SAVE.
See notes 88-89 and accompanying text infra.
38. 89 Wn. 2d at 871-72, 576 P.2d at 406.
39. For purposes of this note a strictly procedural review is one which inquires only into the form
of the proceedings by which a decision is made. Such a review seeks to identify the multitude of
factors considered by the decisionmaking body but does not attempt to assess the relative weights
assigned the various factors by that body. While the Pruzancourt limited itself to a procedural review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the SAVE court did not.
40. Under the traditional statement of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, quoted at
note 14 supra, if the zoning decision so clearly fails to serve the general welfare that there is not room
for two opinions, it will be overturned as an abuse of legislative discretion, regardless of the
decisionmaker's consideration of all relevant facts. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.In
SAVE, therefore, the adverse impacts of the shopping center must have so clearly outweighed its
benefits that the court could not find the validity of the rezone even fairly debatable.
41. Had the court followed Pruzan'sinterpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review, it would have refused to look beyond Bothell's showing of considerations of extralocal interests. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, Bothell's concomitant zoning agreement militates against invalidation of the rezone under the arbitrary and capricious standard. While
the main concern evidenced by the agreement may have been to mitigate impacts adverse to the city
of Bothell, see note 38 and accompanying text supra, the agreement was not wholly one-sided. Its
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deferential standard of review: nowhere in its opinion does it manifest
concern over Bothell's claimed consideration of extralocal interests, nor
does it acknowledge any limits upon the intensity of appropriate judicial
review. 42 Finally, in dictum sounding most inconsistent with the arbitrary
and capricious standard, the court said that for the rezone to be upheld
Bothell would have to take all possible steps to mitigate or avoid adverse
environmental impacts; only then, in the court's enigmatic phrase, might
43
"responsible planning for the shopping center.., be reasonable."
As a result of these uncertain signals in SAVE, it is unclear what standard of review the court will use in future cases in examining zoning decisions which have extralocal impacts. Cases following SAVE are certain to
focus on this issue, since effective judicial enforcement of the regional
welfare duty will require a higher level of scrutiny than is embodied in the
traditional arbitrary and capricious standard. If the court employs a more
probing level of review, judging the sufficiency of the consideration
given to extralocal interests and the adequacy of measures taken to mitigate environmental impacts, the role of the court in land use planning will
be significantly increased, inviting charges of unwarranted judicial intervention. The following section analyzes the arguments for and against
heightened judicial scrutiny in the regional welfare setting.
introductory recitations recognized that the development could have significant impacts on the northeastern Lake Washington region, as well as on the city of Bothell, "which impacts should be
mitigated, within reasonable limits." Concomitant Agreement at 3. The agreement specifically mentioned the possibility that uncontrolled development could have an adverse effect upon the health,
safety and welfare of the residents of the North Creek Valley "and its surrounding environs." Id.'
Further, most of the measures taken by the agreement were designed to mitigate environmental and
aesthetic impacts and would have benefited residents and nonresidents equally.
The court's decision ultimately must rest upon a finding that the economic and environmental costs
of the development outweighed the benefits. Whether there is room for two opinions about the validity of the rezone appears debatable, at least where a balancing of intangible environmental costs and
benefits is involved.
42. The court frequently made the unqualified statement that the regional welfare must be
served, and used conclusory, result-oriented language condemning Bothell's failure to do so. While
the court stated that the mere receipt of comment from other jurisdictions is not sufficient consideration of their interests, the court made no effort to delineate what would be sufficient. The court expressly disclaimed any intention of requiring interjurisdictional planning, but immediately thereafter
emphasized the desirability of such coordinated planning and noted that the result in SAVE might
thereby have been avoided. 89 Wn. 2d at 870, 576 P.2d at 406. The opinion thus suggests that local
zoning officials risk being held not to have adequately considered the extralocal impacts of their decisions unless they actively engage in interjurisdictional planning.
43. 89 Wn. 2d at 870, 576 P.2d at 406. "If it is possible to substantially mitigate or avoid potential adverse environmental effects, and if Bothell takes the necessary steps to do so, responsible planning for the shopping center may be reasonable. It has not acted to avoid these consequences, however, and the rezone cannot be sustained." Id.
In demanding that Bothell take the necessary steps to avoid adverse environmental effects the court
has clearly imposed significant restraints upon the discretion of the legislative decisionmaker. The
enforcement of this requirement, moreover, appears to entail a judicial determination of the range of
possible mitigating measures as well as what constitutes an environmentally acceptable result.

Zoning: The Regional Welfare
II.

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
REGIONAL WELFARE DUTY

A.

ProblemsofIncreasedJudicialIntervention

The court's proper role in the review of local zoning decisions has recently received much attention in the exclusionary zoning field. 44 In
exclusionary zoning cases, as in SAVE, some courts have defined the
general welfare from a regional perspective. 45 More importantly, they
have recognized a conflict between the tradition of judicial deference to
legislative decisionmaking and the type of review necessary for judicial
enforcement of the regional welfare duty. 46 An examination of these
cases reveals that the problem of judicial intervention is the single most
troubling aspect of the regional welfare doctrine.
Three recent exclusionary zoning cases decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court illustrate the judicial struggle with the problem. In Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,47 the court held
exclusionary zoning legislation invalid on the basis of the regional welfare doctrine and imposed a requirement that each municipality satisfy its
fair share of the region's low income housing needs. 48 In Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 49 the court again invalidated an
exclusionary ordinance, following Mount Laurel, but expressed its discomfort with the judicialization of regional housing problems. 50 Finally,

44. See generally Bagne, The ParochialAttitudes of MetropolitanGovernments:An Argument to
a Regional Approach to Urban Planningand Development, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 271 (1978); Haar,
Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957); Rose, Conflict
Between Regionalism and Home Rule: The Ambivalence of Recent Planning Law Decisions, 31
RurGERs L. REv. 1 (1978).

45. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), where Justice Hall of the New Jersey Supreme
Court concisely stated the regional welfare principle and explained its doctrinal basis:
[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a police power of the state
and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted in the same
manner as is the state. So, when regulation does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served.
336 A.2d at 726.
46. See notes 47-58 and accompanying text infra.
47. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
48. 336 A.2d at 730-34.
49. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
50. "[he governmental-sociological-economic enterprise of seeing to the provision and allocation throughout appropriate regions of adequate and suitable housing for all categories of the
population is much more appropriately a legislative and administrative function than a judicial function to be exercised in the disposition of isolated cases." 371 A.2d at 1218.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 55:485, 1980

in Pascack Association, Ltd. v. Mayor of Washington,5 1 the court upheld
an exclusionary zoning ordinance against the challenge that it was defective in not providing for multifamily housing. While the decision rested in
part upon the court's conclusion that Mount Laurel applied only to developing municipalities, 52 the court's "overriding point" concerned the
proper scope of judicial review. 53 The court cited a pre-Mount Laurel decision 54 holding that the legislative nature of zoning decisions puts them
"beyond the purview of interference by the courts, ' ' 55 and then emphasized the broad range of discretion to be accorded local decisionmakers
56
vested by statute with the zoning power.
Thus, within two years of its pioneering decision to review the merits
of local zoning actions to ensure protection of the regional welfare, the
New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional limitation on the
scope of judicial review because of that court's unwillingness to intrude
upon legislative discretion in zoning. At least from the standpoint of judicial enforceability, it may be that little remains of the regional welfare
57
doctrine in New Jersey.
Two other courts which followed New Jersey's lead in recognizing the
regional welfare duty have similarly struggled with the conflict between
traditional restraints on judicial review and protection of the regional welfare. In Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 58 the New York Court of Appeals adopted the regional welfare principle and set forth a two-part test
for determining the validity of an ordinance excluding multifamily
housing. Under the test, the ordinance will be upheld if (1) it provided an
appropriately balanced, well-ordered plan within the community itself,
and (2) the town or board also considered regional needs and requirements in adopting the ordinance. 59 While noting the decision in Mount
Laurel, the Berenson court declined to require that every municipality

51. 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
52. 379 A.2d at 11.
53. Id. at 13.
54. Bow and Arrow Manor, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 307 A.2d 563 (1973).
55. Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 379 A.2d at 11 (quoting Bow & Arrow Manor, Inc.
v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 343, 307 A.2d 563, 567 (1973)).
56. 379 A.2d at 11. 13.
57. This line of New Jersey cases has led one prominent commentator to the following conclusion: "The post-Mount Laurel experience in New Jersey . . .seems to indicate that although the
judiciary may threaten, entreat, cajole, educate, and appeal to a sense of morality, it is an inappropriate branch of government to resolve the underlying conflict between regionalism and home rule."
Rose, Conflict Between Regionalism and Home Rule: The Ambivalence of Recent Planning Law Decisions, 31 RuTGERs L. REV. 1, 21 (1978).

58.
59.

38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
Id. at 109-10, 341 N.E.2d at 242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
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satisfy its fair share of regional housing needs. It saw the judicial role as
60
that of assessing the "reasonableness" of the locality's decision.
In AssociatedHome Builders v. City of Livermore,61 the California Supreme Court also adopted the regional welfare doctrine and spelled out a
"reasonableness" test of its own: The reviewing court must determine
whether the ordinance, in light of its probable impact, represents a reasonable accomodation of the competing interests at stake-typically the
community's desire to maintain the status quo against the housing needs
of the surrounding region. 62 The Livermore court was far more explicit
than the Berenson court in acknowledging the traditional non-interventionist posture of its judicial review:
We do not hold that a court in inquiring whether an ordiance reasonably
relates to the regional welfare, cannot defer to the judgment of the
municipality's legislative body. But judicial deference is not judicial abdication. The ordinance must have a realand substantialrelation to the public welfare.... Although in many cases it will be "fairly debatable" ...
that the ordinance reasonably relates to the regional welfare, it cannot be
assumed that a land use ordinance can never be invalidated as an enactment
63
in excess of the police power.
Thus the California court recognized the regional welfare principle,
and, like the New York court, did so in terms suggesting an unwillingness
to intrude upon legislative discretion. Both courts acknowledged limitations on judicial review quite similar to those recognized by the New Jersey court in Pascack. While all three courts adopted the regional welfare
doctrine, each significantly limited its practical effect by observing the
traditional restraints upon judicial intervention.
The experience of these courts in the exclusionary zoning field is of
particular significance to an evaluation of SAVE. The Washington court
relied upon the Mount Laurel,Berenson, and Livermore cases in adopting
the regional welfare doctrine, 64 but apparently ignored the issue they raise
concerning judicial review. These cases suggest that the judiciary is not
the appropriate institution to protect regional interests from the abuses of

60. Id. at 111,341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682. Under this test, so long as local and
regional housing needs were fulfilled either locally or in other accessible areas within the region, "it
cannot be said, as a matter of law, that such an ordinance had no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare." Id. at 111,241 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681-82.
61. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
62. Id. at 609, 557 P.2d at 488-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
63. Id. (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
64. 89 Wn. 2d at 871, 576 P.2d at 406. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
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local zoning. 65 Emphasizing the legislative nature of zoning, the courts
deciding these cases have restricted their inquiry to a review for arbitrary
and capricious conduct and have been reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of local decisionmakers. As a result, the presumption
favoring validity of zoning ordinances is likely to be overcome only in
66
extreme cases.
There are strong arguments in favor of the judicial restraint exercised
by these three courts. It has generally been acknowledged that courts are
not well equipped to resolve problems associated with land use planning
on a regional scale. 67 They have neither the expertise nor the resources
required to make informed land use planning decisions, and the adversarial nature of the judicial process is poorly suited to the planning task.
To the extent that the SAVE court's enforcement of the regional welfare
duty will entail reviewing the sufficiency of the zoning body's consideration of extralocal interests or the adequacy of measures taken to mitigate
environmental impacts, certainty and finality within this area of the law
will be impaired. Opponents of the zoning decision will be encouraged to
challenge the action taken in the hope that the court will agree with their
view of the merits rather than with that of the legislative decisonmakers.
Even if the local legislative judgment is ultimately upheld, the expense
and delay resulting from such litigation can have a devastating effect
upon private land developers. Similarly, the comprehensive planning ef-

65. For a decision recognizing this principle but refusing to adopt the regional welfare doctrine,
see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 934 (1976). There the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that if an exclusionary ordinance
furthers a legitimate state interest, the court must "defer to the legislative act" and uphold the
ordinance. Id. at 906. While recognizing the interdependence of municipalities and their land use
decisions, the court held that it was up to state legislatures to adjust zoning systems and that the
federal courts "should not be called on to mark the point at which legitimate local interests in promoting the welfare of the community are outweighed by legitimate regional interest." Id. at 908.
66. Unlike the court in SAVE, neither the Berenson court nor the Livermore court was willing to
apply their regional welfare tests to the facts before them. Both courts remanded the cases to the trial
court for review under the regional welfare standards announced.
67. As early as 1957 Professor Charles M. Haar noted:
The limitations of the adversary process and the specialization of courts evoke serious doubts as
to judicial competence in deciding the proper regional allocation of land resources . . ..
Unless the courts are far more adept and skillful than claimed, or the adversary system lends
itself to such analysis, or regionalism is not a job that requires scientific, planning and engineering techniques, there is a patent need for further state legislation as to who should be the ultimate
resolver of regional disputes .... The court lacks the staff, the time or the ability to prepare a
rational regional plan. This kind of decision making seems eminently suited for the administrative process. If, however, the other governmental agencies default, certainty as well as the need
to come to a final decision may be as important as the merits of the particular decision.
Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 530-31 (1957).
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forts of local governments will be jeopardized by the ad hoc determinations of an interventionist court.
Moreover, it is not clear that heightened scrutiny will result in better
land use planning or enhanced protection of regional environmental
values. Courts are limited to an essentially negative role in land use planning; they can only invalidate or uphold decisions made by others. While
the court may prevent a specific shopping center from being built, there is
no assurance that the eventual use to which the land is put will better
serve the regional welfare. The cumulative effect of the resulting piecemeal development may well be more injurious to the environment than
the original proposal, which at least was the product of an overall plan.
Another problem with judicial enforcement of the regional welfare
duty is the absence of clear standards to guide local decisionmakers in the
fulfillment of that duty. While the SAVE court suggested interjurisdictional planning as a means of avoiding judicial invalidation of zoning decisions, 68 it failed to respond to the city's argument that absent comprehensive legislation mandating intergovernmental decisionmaking, local
decisionmakers have no means of compelling other governmental units to
hold hearings or engage in interjurisdictional planning. 69 The city argued
that the absence of statutorily defined standards and procedural protections would invite abuse, giving a handful of administrators from other
jurisdictions a veto power over Bothell's zoning decisions. 70
While these contentions may underestimate the ability of local jurisdictions to plan cooperatively, 71 there are certain to be occasions when, despite a locality's best efforts at cooperative planning, a given zoning
decision will be opposed by neighboring jurisdictions. In such a situation
the local decisionmakers can do little but make the zoning decision and
hope the reviewing court finds its consideration of extralocal interests sufficient, despite the extralocal opposition.
The courts face the same lack of guidelines in resolving disputes be68. See note 42 supra.
69. Brief for Appellants at 28, 32-33, SAVE v. City of Bothell 89 Wn. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401
(1978).
70. Id. at 30. The city also contended that conditioning the validity of Bothell's rezone decisions
on the planning of other jurisdictions would result in ad hoc decisionmaking by local governments.
Moreover, the imposition of such conditions would amount to an impermissible delegation of
Bothell's zoning power to other jurisdictions. Id. at 30-33.
One other possible problem is noted in Alkire, Washinton's Super-Zoning Commission, 14 GoNz.
L. REv. 559 (1979). The author points out that SAVE's command that a municipality must substantially mitigate or avoid potential adverse effects outside its borders appears to conflict with the court's
decision in Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 P. 112 (1927), which held that the
extraterritorial exercise of municipal police power was prohibited under article XI, section 11 of the
state constitution (requiring exercise of police power by a local unit within its limits).
71. The spectre of an interventionist court itself provides impetus toward cooperative planning,
since neighboring municipalities face the same threat.
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tween municipalities over zoning decisions of greater than local impact.
In SAVE the court found Bothell's decision particularly unsatisfactory in
light of two other shopping centers already planned by neighboring jurisdictions. 72 A conflict between two or more municipalities' comprehensive plans is equally possible, where one plan envisioned agricultural
land immediately adjoining the other's planned residential development.
When competing jurisdictions are unable informally to resolve such a
conflict, a court has the unenviable task of deciding whose shopping center or comprehensive plan will prevail. And while the SAVE court appeared to base its decision on the opposition to the rezone voiced by various governmental agencies outside Bothell, clearly such opposition will
not always accurately reflect the regional welfare. The opposition of one
municipality to another's proposed development could stem from a variety of political or economic motives unrelated to the regional welfare.
The court will thus be drawing itself into social and political disputes unsuited to judicial resolution.
B.

Arguments in Favor ofIncreasedJudicialIntervention

While the preceding problems of judicial intervention militate against
heightened scrutiny of zoning decisions to enforce the regional welfare
duty, there are also countervailing considerations which support more rigorous judicial review. Only after striking a balance between these arguments can one evaluate the substantive result in SAVE and develop guidelines for approaching like cases in the future.
First, the problem of parochialism in land use decisionmaking is likely
to be addressed, if at all, only by the courts and not the legislature. Such
parochialism is generally acknowledged to be a product of institutional
fragmentation of the decisionmaking process and the increasing metropolitanization of society. 73 There is a consensus among commentators
and courts that the problem can be adequately solved only through state
legislative reform of the zoning process. 74 The reality with which the
courts must contend, however, is that most state legislatures, including
75
Washington's, appear to be politically unable to address the problem.
72. 89 Wn. 2d at 870, 576 P.2d at 406.
73. See generally Feiler, Metropolitanizationand Land Use Parochialism-Towarda Judicial
Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1971); Vestal, Government Fragmentationin Urban Areas, 43 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 155 (1971).
74. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975); Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 515, 535 (1957).
75. See Rose, Conflict Between Regionalism and Home Rule: The Ambivalence of Recent Planning Law Decisions, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,21 (1978).
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Second, regional interests cannot be effectively protected under the traditional concept of limited judicial review of zoning. 76 In most cases,
even a proforma consideration of extrajurisdictional interests by the zoning board would satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
The likelihood that local decisionmakers may discriminate against nonresident interests not only points to the need for protection of those interests, but also provides a rationale for closer judicial review as an
appropriate form of protection. To a large exent the tradition of judicial
restraint in the review of legislative decisionmaking reflects a fundamental notion of the proper relation between the judicial and legislative
branches under the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. 77 This
basis for judicial deference is lacking, however, in the multijurisidictional
setting of SAVE. Where a legislative decision threatens to affect adversely
individuals who have no say in the makeup of the decisionmaking body,
there is little basis in fact for presuming that the decision is reasonable as
to the nonresidents, or for trusting the political process to protect those
unrepresented individuals. 78 Due process considerations militate strongly
79
against any such presumption.
In 1973 the Washington legislature had before it the proposed Washington Land Use Act which
would have required regional land use planning, intergovernmental cooperation, and special development permits for a "development of greater than local impact." Wash. H.B. 791, §§ 1-101 to 9-201
43d Legis. Regular Sess. (1973). See Hillis & Wilson, Land Use Planningin Washington: Overdue
for Improvement, 10 WtLLAMErE L.J. 320, 331 (1974). See generally, Sylvester, Phoenix Rising?
The Washington Land Use Act, in 11 U~n. L. ANN. 131 (1976). In both 1973 and 1974 the bill passed
the House but died in committee in the Senate. Sylvester, supra, at 143-44.
76. The traditional statement by Washington courts of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review is reproduced in note 14 supra.
77. A court's statement that zoning is a "legislative task" reflects a concession that the courts
lack the resources or expertise to perform properly the zoning job through the disposition of isolated
cases. A more fundamental objection is that the substantive review of local zoning decisions is inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. Ullock v. City of Bremerton, 17 Wn. App. 573, 565
P.2d 1179 (1977). See also Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th
Cir. 1975) ('[b]eing neither a super legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal court is without
authority to weigh and reappraise the factors considered or ignored by the legislative body in passing
the challenged zoning regulation").
78. Nonresident individuals are, of course, represented in the state legislature which delegated
the zoning power to local decisionmakers in the first place. It would be unrealistic, however, to
assume that such state representation provides meaningful protection, given the strong tradition of
local autonomy in zoning and the relatively small number of nonresidents affected. Cf. Note, Phased
Zoning:Regulationof the Tempo andSequence of LandDevelopment, 26 ST~AN.
L. REv. 585, 608-09
n.96 (1974) (impact of land use regulation on nonrepresented individuals provides weak basis for
judicial intervention in view of individuals' representation at state government level from which local
municipalities derive their zoning power).
79. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In the majority opinion's
famous footnote 4, Justice Stone suggested that a "more exacting judicial scrutiny" than the traditional presumption of constitutionality might be appropriate in reviewing "legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." Id. at 152 n.4. He further suggested that similar considerations might warrant closer scrutiny

499

Washington Law Review

Vol. 55:485, 1980

Shortly before its decision in SAVE, the Washington court drew a distinction between types of zoning actions, and the scope of judicial review
applicable to each, which supports the proposition that less deference
should be accorded legislative decisions in the multijurisdictional setting.
In Parkridgev. City of Seattle, 80 the court characterized zoning actions as
either legislative or adjudicative in nature, and accorded the traditional
presumption of validity only to the legislative decisions. 81 The court differentiated the legislative policymaking involved in the enactment of a
comprehensive plan from the adjudicative activity involved in deciding
between the readily identifiable rights and interests of proponents and opponents of a zoning change. The court emphasized that the far greater
impact of a rezone on one group than on the public generally justified
more rigorous judicial review.
82
While the Parkridgeanalysis was not mentioned by the SAVE court,
of statutes directed at particular religious, ethnic, racial, or otherwise "discrete and insular minorities" when prejudice threatens "to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect [them]." Id. at 153 n.4.
While a zoning regulation which affects individuals residing outside the enacting jurisdiction does
not fall precisely within either of Justice Stone's classifications, it does present an analogous problem
requiring a similar judicial solution. Because nonresident individuals adversely affected by a zoning
ordinance cannot vote in the election of the decisionmakers involved, the political processes
"ordinarily relied upon" to protect their interests are not of much use. Indeed, this "minority" of
affected nonresidents is arguably in greater need of judicial protection than those "discrete and insular
minorities" which have only prejudice to fight. The nonresidents do not even get to vote. But see note
78 supra.
80. 89 Wn. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359(1978).
81. Id. at 460, 573 P.2d at 365. In refusing to presume the validity of a rezone ordinance passed
by the city of Seattle, the court said that the rezone was adjudicative in nature and therefore required a
showing of substantial credible evidence to support the city's decision. The court quoted from Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972), for its distinction between legislative
and adjudicative zoning functions:
Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehensive plan and zoning code it
acts in a policy making capacity. But in amending a zoning code, or reclassifying land thereunder, the same body, in effect, makes an adjudication between the rights sought by the proponents and those claimed by the opponents of the zoning change. The parties whose interests are
affected are readily identifiable. Although important questions of public policy may permeate a
zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact on one group of citizens than on the
public generally.
89 Wn. 2d at 463, 573 P.2d at 365 (quoting Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d at 299, 502 P.2d
at 331). For a discussion of the Parkridge rezone standards, see Note, Zoning-Rezones: New
Standardsfor Governing Bodies-Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 55 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1979).
82. Because the ordinance challenged in SAVE was a rezone, the question arises whether SAVE's
deeper judicial review was only an unarticulated, but consistent, application of the Parkridgerationale. Although some indirect support for deeper judicial review in the multijurisdictional setting of
SAVE can be derived from Parkridge,see note 83 and accompanying text infra, it would be wrong to
view the latter case as controlling in SAVE. The SAVE court did not mention Parkridgeor its distinction between legislative and adjudicative acts and made no reference to the requirement of substantial
credible evidence, the essence of the Parkridgeruling. More important, it would weaken the Parkridge rationale to have classified Bothell's action as adjudicative merely on the basis of its technical
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the line it draws between policymaking and adjudication lends support to
a more probing judicial review in the mulitjurisdictional setting of SAVE.
If because of its extralocal impacts a municipality's proposed action
threatens to place local and regional interests in opposition, the action
could be seen as "an adjudication between the rights sought by the propoclaimed by the opponents [the nonresinents [the municipality] and those
83
change."
zoning
the
of
dents]
A final factor which may support more rigorous judicial review, and
which was of particular importance in SAVE, is the "fundamental and
inalienable right to a healthful environment" guaranteed Washington's
citizens by SEPA. 84 While the SAVE court used this strong environmental
policy only as support for its imposition of the regional welfare duty, the
policy may also explain the court's interventionist tone. The court found
the SEPA right of such importance that it required Bothell's decisionmakers not only to consider environmental impacts but also to take the steps
necessary to avoid them. 85 Because effective enforcement of this requirement is impossible under the arbitrary and capricious standard, 86 the court
may implicitly have found that the importance of the SEPA right justified
a higher level of review.
This conclusion is reinforced by the SAVE court's treatment of State ex
rel. Pruzan v. Redman. 87 Although the Pruzan court declined to look bestatus as a rezone. Bothell's original comprehensive plan, adopted in 1971, specifically envisioned
the eventual transition to commercial and other more intensive uses at the location in question. It
would strain the logic of Parkridgeto woodenly characterize as adjudicative a rezone so intimately
related to the original legislative act. But see Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wn. 2d 847, 557 P.2d
1306 (1976) (same rezone as that invalidated in SAVE held to be "administrative" or "quasi-judicial"
action and therefore not subject to referendum election).
83. Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d at 299, 502 P.2d at 331. As in Fleming, the parties
whose interests are affected would be readily identifiable. This would be true even where the decision
is legislative under Fleming and Parkridge;its multijurisdictional impact necessarily divides the general public into two groups, one on each side of the municipal boundary.
84. WASH. REv. ConE § 43.21C.020(3) (1979). The court's reliance upon this SEPA provision
may be the single most important aspect of the case. The high value accorded environmental
protection by SEPA appears directly related to the court's willingness to intervene with its nondeferential review, and was a consideration entirely separate from the multijurisdictional setting of the
case. See notes 85-92 and accompanying text infra. Moreover, this factor distinguishes the regional
welfare duty imposed in SAVE from that of the exclusionary zoning cases which focus upon the duty
to consider regional housing needs. After citing the exclusionary zoning cases, the SAVE court found
its regional welfare duty to exist "when the interest at stake is the quality of the environment." 89
Wn. 2d at 871,576 P.2d at 406.
85. See note 43 and -accompanying text supra. Prior to SAVE the Washington court had not
determined the substantive impact of SEPA upon decisionmaking made subject to that Act. But see
Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 497 n.6, 513 P.2d 36, 49 n.6
(1973) (where adverse environmental impacts are indicated, project approval may be an abuse of
discretion if mitigation or avoidance of impacts was possible.)
86. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
87. 60 Wn. 2d 521,374 P.2d 1002 (1962).
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yond the formal indicia of a city's consideration of extralocal interests,
the SAVE court distinguished Pruzan as not having involved
environmental effects as substantial and pervasive as those involved in
SAVE, 88 and overruled Pruzan only to "the extent that it conflicts with
the [regional welfare] duty we here impose.'"89 As a result, absent such
substantial and pervasive environmental impacts, Pruzan's limited judicial review would arguably still apply.
In Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 decided after SAVE, the Washington court explicitly identified the importance of Washington's strong
environmental policy as a justification for heightened judicial review.
The court there ruled that judicial review of administrative land use decisions which are based upon environmental impact statements under
SEPA must be conducted under the "clearly erroneous," as opposed to
the arbitrary and capricious, standard. 9 1 The court adopted the higher degree of scrutiny in part "to ensure that an appropriate balance between
economic, social, and environmental values is struck." 92 This same concern might explain the court's heightened scrutiny of the zoning ordinance in SAVE.
C.

Balancingthe Arguments Against and in Favorof Heightened
JudicialReview

The arguments of the preceding section present a plausible, if not compelling, rationale for heightened judicial scrutiny of zoning decisions
which have significant environmental effects in other jurisdictions. The
protection of affected but unrepresented interests is a persuasive doctrinal
justification for stepping beyond the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review. 93 The court's solicitude for SEPA-based environmental values,
already reflected in heightened judicial scrutiny of purely local land use
decisions, pushes even more strongly for nondeferential review when the
94
impacts extend beyond local boundaries.
88. 89 Wn. 2d at 870, 576 P.2d at 406.
89. Id. See note 37 supra.
90. 90 Wn. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
91. Id. at 69,578 P.2d at 1315.
92. Id. Though the Polygon holding concerned a decision of an administrative official denying a
development proposal, in both that case and SAVE the court closely scrutinized the consideration
given the environment by the decisionmaker. Cf. Note, EnvironmentalLaw-A Standardfor Judicial
Review ofAdministrative Decisionmaking Under SEPA-Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 54 WAsH.
L. Rav. 693 (1979) (arguing that Polygon supports judicial policy of greater environmental protection
through closer judicial review and suggests the decision will govern the review of legislative as well
as administrative decisionmaking under SEPA).
93. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text supra.
94. See notes 83-92 and accompanying text supra.
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The force of these arguments nevertheless fails to wholly overcome
the problems generated by a more active judicial role. The field of land
use law demands a degree of certainty and finality which is threatened by
an interventionist judiciary. Inherent institutional limitations upon the
courts also counsel against too great a judicial involvement in zoning
95
matters.
An awareness of the social costs of judicial intervention is likely to
constrain a court's willingness to override the local, legislative judgment
in a fairly debatable case. Only if faced with major environmental impacts on areas outside of the enacting jurisdiction, or clear indications of
local discrimination against extralocal interests, should the court consider
displacing the judgment of the local legislative decisionmaker. Conversely, if a zoning decision does not significantly threaten extralocal environmental interests, or clearly discriminate between the local and the
regional welfare, a court should be most reluctant to intervene.
Given the impossiblity of fashioning an adequate judicial solution to
the inherent conflict between local and regional interests in land use
decisionmaking, the court's decision in SAVE is justified. The court
firmly established the duty to serve the welfare of the entire community
affected by a zoning change, and forcefully condemned the idea that one
locality may advance its own ends with a blind eye toward the consequences of its actions for its neighbors. The court's summary rejection of
Bothell's claimed consideration of extralocal interests serves as a warning to localities throughout the state that the court will look beyond surface appearances when regional environmental interests are at stake. And
if Bothell's rezone was not as clear an embodiment of parochial
decisionmaking as the court's opinion would suggest, the court thereby
96
created a strong impetus to cooperative, interjurisdictional planning.
At the same time, whether by design or not, the SAVE opinion leaves
ample room for the operation of the polices which militate against judicial intervention. The court's conclusory language closely ties its inteventionist result to the specific facts of SAVE. The arbitrary and capricious standard of review is retained in name if not in substance. The
court may thus freely avoid the result of SAVE in a future case where the
costs of judicial intervention appear to outweigh the need to protect the
regional welfare. Thus, the intimidating example set by the court's decision in SAVE may win some measure of protection for regional environmental interests while not committing the court to an overly interventionist level of judicial review.
MichaelH. Rorick
95.
96.

See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 42 and 71 supra.
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